Practically since the last shot was fired in anger between those in Blue and those in Gray, historians and commentators have traded verbal and written barbs in an almost never ending Civil War of words. The proper place of the Civil War in American history and the role of slavery is the focus of most commentaries, but local issues remain pertinent as the nation nears the Civil War’s sesquicentennial. The proper place of the Border States remains a hot bed of contention and the question arises as to the proper categorizing of states like Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky. Maryland’s role in the Civil War remains a disputed issue, as its proximity to Washington DC places Maryland at the forefront of the so-called Borders States simply by accident of geography. Maryland, more than any other state, had an identity crisis; unfortunately, this crisis of identity is manufactured. It simply did not exist during the Civil War, nor did it exist during most of the period since the end of the war. The allegiance of the Old Line State did not become cloudy until the Civil Rights movement ended the chic and mystique of the South and the Confederacy. As the argument over the Civil War focused on the evils of slavery to the practical exclusion of everything else, Maryland’s role in the Civil War became obscured. The issue has divided historians of Maryland into two camps: those that view Maryland as a Southern state and those that choose to emphasize a latent Unionism in the Old Line State. For all intents and purposes, the only points in which the two groups can agree are that Maryland was a slave state and that it did remain, for reasons largely outside her control, in the Union. However, the preponderance of evidence favors the argument that Maryland would have joined the Confederacy if allowed to choose.
This paper will argue that Maryland, if allowed to choose freely, would have sided with the Confederacy. There are several arguments in favor of a Confederate Maryland. Maryland’s political and cultural sympathies were in alignment with the rest of the South. Second, the vast majority of the politically elite families of Maryland sent sons to fight for the Confederacy. A large number of Unionist Marylanders expressed exasperation with the Emancipation Proclamation. In addition, a surprising number expressed sympathy for the Confederacy. The third major point focuses on the Union draftees and recruits from Maryland. The vast majority of Maryland Union soldiers were recent immigrants to the state. Maryland was the only “loyal” state that failed to meet its enlistment quotas. As a result, many Maryland Union units were recruited partially in other states, such as West Virginia or Pennsylvania. Confederate Marylanders, on the other hand, were all volunteers and they frequently suffered personal and financial hardship to fight for a cause in which they believed. Confederate sympathizers quickly re-established political control over Maryland. Ex-Confederate Marylanders dominated the postwar militia in the state. While other Union states celebrated their loyal past, Maryland would adopt, postwar, a flag and state song with strong Confederate ties. The final argument supporting a Confederate Maryland is the simple fact that Maryland was under military occupation and suffered through martial law, election fraud, arrests of prominent citizens, arbitrary and capricious edicts, and the suspension of civil liberties.
This paper is an attempt to recapture a portion of Maryland’s history that was lost in a period when historical revisionism became accepted. It is acknowledged that history from time to time must be corrected when new facts and information is brought to light. While acknowledging the noble purpose of much of the new histories that give voice to women and minorities, groups neglected in the past, this paper rejects attempts to distort the past for the sake of political or cultural convenience. The arguments put forth both support and supplant the works of Harry Wright Newman, Bart Rhett Talbert and Lawrence Denton, all of whom wrote extensively on this subject. The main difference between this paper and previous works is the attention it provides to the changing nature of the historiography of Maryland.
The commencement of artillery fire on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861 opened a firestorm upon the country. The bombardment in Charleston harbor and the resultant outrage among the Northern populace forced Abraham Lincoln to issue a call for volunteers to suppress the Rebellion. This forced the hand of the slave states of the upper South. Prior to Lincoln’s call for volunteers, the upper South had rejected the calls of outright secession, yet their sympathies remained with the Southern states. It was the idea that the Northern government would use coercion to keep the Southern states in the Union that tipped the balance in favor of secessionism in states like North Carolina, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Virginia. The same arguments reverberated in Maryland, as well, but the unfortunate (for Confederate hopes) laws of geography placed Maryland in a position unique among all of the states. Simply put, if Maryland seceded, it would have isolated Washington City. The Lincoln Administration simply could not allow Maryland to join its Southern brethren and it quickly moved to occupy Maryland by military force.[1]
The argument that Maryland possessed a latent Unionism that would have kept the state allied with the North is problematic. Such an argument requires ignoring the cultural and political history of Maryland. Goucher University Professor of History Jean Harvey Baker is representative of such rationalizations. Baker comments, “Aided by the governor’s [Maryland Governor Hicks] revived Unionism, economic ties with the North and West, and the appearance of federal troops [emphasis added], Maryland chose [emphasis added] the Union.”[2] Baker, in the same paragraph, boldly states that Unionist sympathy was the majority sentiment in the state in 1861 by quoting the sentiments of a Maryland Republican, a group decidedly in the minority in the state in 1861.[3]
In all fairness, Maryland did possess a large number of Unionists, particularly in the Western part of the state. However, strong pockets of Unionist sentiment existed throughout most of the Confederacy, with the exception of South Carolina. The Unionists of Western North Carolina and Eastern Tennessee caused the Davis Administration a great deal of consternation. Yet in those states, the Unionist sentiment was decidedly in the minority and did not prevent the states from seceding from the Union. Arguments in favor of the strength of Maryland Unionism would hold weight if Maryland had shown a pattern of political and cultural sentiment that was in line with Northern sentiment. However, the historical record unambiguously states that Maryland was politically in tune with Virginia and its Southern brethren rather than with Pennsylvania and the North. Since the founding of the United States, when sectionalism threatened national unity, Maryland sided with the South.[4] In sectional arguments as diverse as navigational rights on the Mississippi, the admission of Missouri as a slave state, to the 1850’s issue over restricting the slave trade, Maryland always voted in lock step with the rest of the South.[5]
When slavery became an issue in national elections, Maryland strongly rejected anti-slavery candidates and voted consistently with the rest of the South. In the only national election, 1856, in which Maryland voted differently than the rest of the South, she voted for Millard Fillmore, a supporter of the Compromise of 1850. Fillmore’s Know-Nothing Party held considerable strength among the rest of the Upper South and not just in Maryland. Fillmore came very close to winning Tennessee (See Appendix C), a state that ultimately seceded. In addition, there was considerable political violence in Maryland in the 1840’s and 1850’s, when voter fraud and intimidation against Democratic voters was widespread, potentially artificially magnifying Know-Nothing support. The anti-slavery candidates, Hale in 1852 and Fremont in 1856, registered 21 and 285 votes respectively. That the anti-slavery candidate received no real support in these elections from Maryland voters does more than suggest such sympathies were alien to the average Maryland voter. [6]
By the time of the 1860 election, tensions in the country had risen considerably. Several Southern states, stirred up by Northern reactions to the John Brown Raid, warned of secession if the Republican Abraham Lincoln won the Presidential election. For the states, including Maryland, in which all four major candidates (Lincoln, Breckenridge, Bell, and Douglas) participated, there was a stark choice. For the Maryland voter, a vote for Lincoln represented the abolitionist extreme. A vote for Douglas represented the moderate, but still Northern vote, as perceived by Marylanders. A vote for Bell was a vote for compromise and preservation of the Union, in other words, a moderate Southern vote. Vice President Breckenridge represented the uncompromising Southern vote. Ultimately, Maryland voters rejected both Lincoln and Douglas out of hand. Lincoln’s greatest, though still modest, support came from Allegheny County in the Western part for the state, a section where Unionism was strongest. Unfortunately, the strong showing of Bell in the election has led to a number of conclusions that overestimate Unionist sentiment in Maryland.[7]
William J. Evitts, author of A Matter of Allegiances, Maryland From 1850 to 1861, stated rather unequivocally that, “In the counties of Maryland, the Bell, Lincoln, and Douglas voters were doubtless as Unionist as their leaders.”[8] Evitts commented further,
Unionism then was the majority sentiment in the counties of Maryland early in 1861. If a majority of the Bell, Douglas, and Lincoln voters were anti-secessionist, the 1860 vote gives a rough indication of Unionist strength. In the counties of Maryland, Bell, Douglas, and Lincoln totaled 54 percent of the vote to Breckenridge’s 46 percent. Though some of these non-Breckenridge voters may later have favored a league with the seceding states, that portion must have been small, and it was probably balanced by Breckenridge voters who later could not face the actuality of secession of Maryland. Baltimore, as usual was something of an anomaly. Although the city went for Breckenridge, the majority there was probably Unionist [emphasis added], too. The Breckenridge vote was not a true indication of Baltimoreans’ identification with the Southern Rights position. Commercial interests led the city cautiously to support the national government and Hicks conservative position.[9]
The statement was reprinted in its entirety to point out its problems in historical interpretation. Evitts offers little to support this argument, other than his personal opinion. Commentaries from contemporary sources are at odds with the argument cited above. Jean Baker agrees with the Evitts conclusions. Both Evitts and Baker had access to contemporary sources, yet they, for reasons unknown, chose to ignore evidence that did not support their arguments. In Baker’s case, she misquoted Mayor Brown of Baltimore in support of a source.[10]
In order to sustain Evitts’ postulate that Maryland was inherently Unionist, it must follow that the vast majority of Bell supporters were Unconditional Unionists. In addition, Evitts’ reasoning would suggest implicitly that the Bell supporters in Maryland were vastly different in sentiment from those in other Southern states (Virginia and Tennessee); otherwise, the strength of Bell supporters would have kept those states in the Union. The argument is conceded that Douglas and Lincoln supporters remained Unconditional Unionists, but to suggest that the vast majority of Bell supporters remained emotionally tied to the Union is a logical stretch. However, there was a significant difference between the Unconditional Unionist, which supported the Union at all costs, from that of Conditional Unionists, who were prepared to break up the Union if the conditions warranted. Prior to Lincoln’s call for 75,000 volunteers, only the lower South had left the Union, most of the Upper South had rejected the calls to break up the Union.[11] The situation was vastly different after the call for volunteers, an act that led to the secession of Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and North Carolina.
Evitts suggests that all, or at least the vast majority, of Maryland Bell supporters were Unconditional Unionists.[12] John Bell’s Constitutional Unionist Party, comprised of many former Know-Nothings and Old Southern Whigs, managed to secure Electoral victory in Virginia, Tennessee, Missouri and Kentucky, and came close to winning in Maryland, North Carolina, and Louisiana (see Appendix A).[13] All of the aforementioned states were part of the Upper South with the exception of Louisiana. In addition, Bell’s party had strong showings in Arkansas and Georgia. Such widespread support among Southern states, the majority ultimately seceding, with the exception of Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland, suggests that Bell supporters in the South were not averse to leaving the Union, one provision being the coercion of the seceding states.[14] North Carolina Bell supporter John A. Gilmer stated emphatically that the vast majority of the Constitutional Unionists of Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee, Missouri, and Kentucky were opposed to any use of force on the part of the Federal government.[15] Illustrative of the conditional Unionism of the Constitutional Unionist is that Bell himself denounced Lincoln’s call for troops to coerce the Southern states and supported the Confederacy.[16]
The fact remains that states, such as North Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee, in which support for the Constitutional Unionists was strong, eventually joined the Confederacy. There is little reason to suspect, outside anecdotal evidence, that Bell supporters in Maryland were willing to support Unconditional Unionism. Postwar Maryland historians, many of whom were eyewitnesses to the events, stated emphatically that Marylander’s sympathies were with the South. Maryland historian John Thomas Scharf, an eyewitness, stated emphatically that three-fourths of Marylanders were opposed to the coercion of the South and that a decided majority were in favor of secession if a choice was forced upon the state.[17] George Radcliffe, the only historian to see Maryland Governor Thomas Holliday Hicks’ wartime papers, stated that the majority agreed that, after Lincoln’s call for volunteers, the Lincoln and Republican Party agenda “must be opposed at all costs.”[18] Presumably, that majority would include a number of Bell supporters. In addition, Radcliffe was in full agreement that the public sentiment of Marylanders was in favor of secession.[19]
That the Maryland Constitutional Unionists were not in complete sympathy with maintaining the Union is evident, at least anecdotally, in a letter sent by Governor Hicks to fellow Marylander and Bell supporter Sprigg Harwood dated November 27, 1860.[20] Hicks, a former Know-Nothing, expressed full support for the arguments of the Southern states in this private letter to Harwood, yet curiously, Hicks would duplicitously do everything possible to avoid calling the Maryland legislature, in spite of repeated calls, and eventually side with the Lincoln Administration over its Maryland policies. In a speech in April of 1861, Hicks stated, “I am a Marylander; I love my state and I love the Union, but I will suffer my right arm to be torn from my body before I raise it to strike a sister state.”[21] If the citizens of Maryland had any knowledge that Hicks was conspiring with Federal troops to occupy Maryland, it is unlikely that Hicks would have escaped alive.[22] Lastly, a group of citizens, frustrated with Hick’s refusal to call out the Assembly, voted to create a state convention on the impending crisis. The Convention consisted mostly of Democrats, but did contain several prominent Bell supporters, John Brune, President of the Baltimore Board of Trade, among them.[23] The conclusion of this informal convention was that Maryland’s rights outweighed that of the Union and that the state should wait for and act in concert with Virginia.[24]
On April 18, 1861, several Baltimore citizens and Union soldiers of the 6th MA Infantry clashed on the streets of Baltimore, the first bloodshed of the War. Mob violence was nothing new to the state, but the list of wounded Marylanders contained many prominent citizens.[25] George William Brown, Mayor of Baltimore at the time, commented that public sentiment favored joining the Confederacy, yet simple geography conspired against Maryland secessionism.[26] Maryland sentiment was decidedly in favor of secession.[27] Daniel Carroll Toomey, Maryland historian and scion of the Carroll family (including descent from Unionist Anna Ella Carroll, as well as, several Confederate Carrolls), echoed Brown’s sentiment.[28] From the available evidence, the most acceptable conclusion is that Maryland’s public sentiment bordered between favoritism for the Confederacy to Conditional Unionism. Conditional Unionism died with the call for volunteers by the Lincoln Administration.
The actions of the Maryland Legislature in the immediate weeks and months are not suggestive of latent Unionism, as suggested by Evitts and Baker.[29] While it is true that Maryland did not secede, it was largely because the state was under the occupation of the Union Army. On April 22, 1861, Governor Hicks called for a special session of the Legislature to meet at Frederick, MD on the 26th. By the 22nd, Annapolis was under occupation. On April 28th, the War Department divided Maryland into three military commands and issued orders for the troops assembling in Pennsylvania and northern states to occupy the state and place it under martial law.[30] The Maryland Assembly was well aware that Maryland was about to be occupied. Hicks assembled the Legislature, deliberately and with duplicity, in the area of the state with the strongest Unionist sentiment.[31] Amazingly, the Maryland Legislature adopted a resolution denying that it had the right to secede.[32] Unfortunately, several historians, including Baker and Evitts, have misinterpreted this act. Jean Baker, disturbingly, though she had access to George Radcliffe’s notes, states the [Legislature after commencing their meeting], “promptly proved their loyalty to the Union, viewing their role as that of watchful critics, not secessionists.”[33] Baker further added that the [Legislature was] “unquestionably, loyal to the Union.”[34] What Baker missed was the caveat that, while the Legislature denied that the Maryland Assembly did not possess the right to secede, the Legislature could call a special convention for this purpose. Such a convention would have plenipotentiary power and it was implied by the wording of the act that such a convention would shortly be called into session.[35] The sentiment among several members was to seek assistance from Virginia; however, Virginia did not hold its public referendum until May 23, 1861. By that time, the actions of the Federal Government meant that it was too late for Maryland to act.
During the same short session, the Legislature passed a resolution appropriating $2,000,000 for the defense of the state, the implication was that the defense was to be against the Northern troops soon to be entering the state and this was not lost on anyone, least of all the Lincoln Administration.[36] In addition, the appropriation bill contained a provision that commissioned into the state militia several well-known Southern sympathizers, the majority of these newly commissioned officers would end up serving the Confederacy in some capacity. [37]
By voice vote, the Maryland Legislature put on the public record that Maryland was now a “conquered province.”[38] The Joint House and Senate Committee on Federal Relations passed, with unanimous consent by vocal acclimation, to maintain cordial relations with Virginia while condemning the Lincoln Administration’s actions towards the Confederacy.[39] The Committee, while made up mostly of Democrats, included several supporters of John Bell.[40]
The final break between Hicks and the Legislature occurred with the beginning of the arrests of Maryland citizens and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in May.[41] The arrests precipitated bolder action on the part of the Legislature, realizing that the military occupation of Maryland precluded outright secession; the Maryland Legislature voted to recognize the Confederacy and passed a resolution calling on its members of the Federal House and Senate to propose legislations doing the same.[42] In a small show of defiance, the Maryland legislature refused to fly the National flag during its session.[43] When the Legislature adjourned on July 30, 1861, it agreed to reconvene on September 17, 1861, but events would prevent these legislatures from convening as a body.
After the violence in Baltimore on the 19th of April and the threats of secession, the Lincoln Administration immediately took measures that ensured Maryland’s loyalty by force. While the original concern of the Administration was for the military security of the Capital, the political suppression in Maryland quickly took on political overtones long after the capital was secure.[44] For an ostensibly “loyal” state, the arrests of the Chief of Police and Mayor of Baltimore, the entire Baltimore Police Commission, several hundred citizens, including sitting judges, and arrested over a third of the state legislature.[45] The total number of legislators arrested would have been higher, except that several members had seen the writing on the wall and escaped to Virginia.[46] Jean Baker downplays the action by dubiously calling the Lincoln Administrations fears unfounded.[47] However, the perception of both the Lincoln and Davis Administrations was such that they both viewed secession by the Maryland Legislature, spurred on by the Confederate victory at First Manassas, likely.[48] In addition, the Lincoln Administration was determined to maintain Maryland as the “first of the redeemed by voter intimidation, placing soldiers at polling places with orders to arrest known Southern Sympathizers, and outright fraud.”[49] The arrests and intimidation were enough that the Maryland Legislature, which, during the summer months did everything short of seceding to oppose the policies of the Abraham Lincoln, was unable to obtain a quorum and, in turn, were replaced by loyal Unionists.[50] Among the citizens arrested included the grandson of Francis Scott Key and a descendent of Maryland Revolutionary War Hero John Eager Howard.[51]
Among the indignities Marylanders suffered during the Civil War was the suspension of the freedom of the press, including the permanent closing of eight newspapers.[52] Decrees issued by military authorities banned the wearing of the Botany cross or any symbol that could be remotely tied to the Confederacy.[53] The lack of civil liberties and martial law in Maryland reached the bizarre, military officials began issuing orders about what sermons could be preached to ministers in the pulpit.[54] Residents were threatened with arrest for failing to display the national flag and, on one occasion, a bank president was arrested for tipping his hat to Confederate prisoners.[55] The treatment of Maryland was reminiscent of an occupied country rather than a loyal state.
One test for Unionist sentiment in Maryland was to examine the loyalties of its prominent well-established families. It is conceded that immigration and interstate migration was widespread in America and this certainly changed the political landscape to some degree, however, in Southern states, the first families retained substantial power and influence. In Maryland, the vast majority of its leading families favored the Confederacy, including most of the existing group that could trace descent from the original settlers from the Ark and the Dove.[56] While the Shriver and Carroll families were split in sympathies, the Howards, Keys of Francis Scott Key fame, Gists, Tilghmans, Ridgelys, Gaithers, Bowies, Cockeys, Maryland Lees, Steuarts, Goldboroughs, Calverts, Archers and Ringgolds, among others, supported the Confederacy.[57] The famous Cary sisters of Baltimore represented the most eligible belles of the South and they showed their support for the Southern cause by sewing the first design of what would become the famed battle flag.[58] Curiously, the only son of Augustus Bradford, the Unionist successor of Governor Hicks, served in the Confederate Army.[59]
Historian Kevin Conley Ruffner, who did an extensive survey of Maryland’s junior officers for both Union and Confederate Armies, stated, “few Maryland Union officers had extensive connections to the state.”[60] Nor could they claim lineage to Maryland’s patriotic past or to its prewar militia, the vast majority of whom served the Confederacy. The vast majority of Maryland’s junior Union officer corps hailed from recent immigrants to Baltimore or Western Maryland.[61]
Almost half of the officers in Union Maryland units were born outside the state, while only a few of the junior level Maryland officers in Gray were born elsewhere.[62] Interestingly, the prewar Maryland gangs, such as the Plug Uglies and Rip Raps, were well represented among the Maryland Union officer corps.[63]
Presumably, for an ostensibly loyal Union state, Maryland had the most difficulty of all the Union states in filling its enlistment quotas. Of all the Union states, Maryland had by far the worst record and never once reached its quota during the period of voluntary enlistments. The problem in Union enlistments stands in stark contrast to the 20,000 plus Marylanders who volunteered with the Confederacy, the vast majority of the latter group left in 1861. [64]
Of the 42,713 Marylanders that served the Union, the vast majority enlisted after the 1863 draft went into effect.[65] During the period of voluntary enlistments, Maryland enlisted less than half of its 27,000 quota.[66] Seventy-Six percent of the 13,343 pre-draft volunteers hailed from the western part of the state.[67] While Confederate sympathizing Marylanders were flocking to the Southern banner, not one Marylander responded to Lincoln’s initial call (April 15, 1861) for 75,000 volunteers.[68] Lincoln’s second call for 500,000 volunteers on May 3, 1861 placed a quota of 15,578 on Maryland, yet only 9,355 responded to the call.[69] The lack of recruits became a public embarrassment to Maryland Unionists, particularly when other states exceeded their quotas.[70] The lack of recruits led to ever-increasing bounties, paid by local jurisdictions, in order to entice new enlistees; in many cases, these funds came from private funds or were promised with the hope of reimbursement from the Federal government.[71]
The idea of a strong statewide Unionist sentiment is at best grossly exaggerated. During the period of volunteer enlistments (1861-1862), the Marylanders serving the Confederacy outnumbered those that fought for the Blue by almost two to one.[72] During the war, any Marylander who wished to enlist in the armed forces of the United States could simply walk to the corner recruiting office.[73] Those that fought for the Confederacy were forced to literally escape to the South, often lost property, while their families suffered harassment at the hands of the local authorities.[74] The hardships suffered by the Maryland Confederates suggest that, as a group, they were exceptionally well motivated to the cause of the South, in contrast to the lukewarm support shown by the state to enlisting for the Union.
When the draft was finally initiated in 1863, Marylanders continued to show a less than enthusiastic support for the Union. Of the initial 4,000 draftees, just under 3,000 failed to appear; of the remaining thousand, 3/4ths provided a substitute, leaving only approximately 200 Marylanders who physically responded to the first draft.[75]
While there are only two Maryland infantry/battalions, two cavalry regiments, and four artillery batteries that fought for the Confederacy, a considerable number of Marylanders served in other state units.[76] Of the non-colored Union Maryland units raised: including 19 infantry regiments, 4 cavalry regiments, and 6 artillery batteries, several of the units recruited wholly or partially in other states.[77] For example, 1/3 of the 3rd Regiment of Maryland Infantry hailed from what is now West Virginia.[78] One company of the 4th Maryland Infantry was raised in Adams County, PA.[79] The Fifth Maryland Infantry contained large numbers of men from Philadelphia and Delaware.[80]
A substantial number of the recruits of the rest of the Maryland Union Regiments were citizens of Pennsylvania and West Virginia. The two 100 day regiments -- the 11th and 12 Maryland Infantry -- opened enlistments to men from all of the states, including a number of discharged veterans from states as far away as Ohio and Indiana.
The lack of a large number of enthusiastic Maryland volunteers is telling, but it is only part of the story. The vast majority of Marylanders who enlisted did so to preserve the Union.[81] A survey of the letters from the Maryland Brigade (1st, 4th, 7th and 8th Maryland) found no abolitionists and a surprising number that held outright contempt for blacks.[82] After the Emancipation Proclamation, a surprising number of Maryland junior officers from the same brigade showed contempt for Lincoln and his edict.[83] Most astonishing is the rare but not uncommon sentiment, which suggests sympathy for the Confederacy or indignation at the idea of remaining in the US Army.[84]
The final argument in favor of a Confederate Maryland is the post war rejection of the Wartime Unionist Party and the return of the Pro-Confederate Democrats to political power. In 1867, Maryland voters rejected the hated 1864 Constitution, the shortest lived in the history of the state, and quickly replaced it with a new policy favorable to the citizens of the state.[85] The Democratic Party, after regaining power, would remain supreme as a Southern party well into the 20th Century.[86] Of the commanding generals of the Maryland Militia from 1867 to 1904, only two served in the Union Army, the remaining six were all veterans of the Confederate Army.[87] The lasting legacy of a Confederate Maryland is that the state song and flag are Pro-Confederate in sympathy or contain Confederate symbols.[88] To Maryland’s shame, the state quickly adopted Jim Crow type laws, like their fellow Southern states, laws that were not repealed until the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s. Lastly, for an ostensibly Unionist state, in the words of Baker and Evitts, Maryland was a loyal state that contains more monuments to its Confederate veterans and the Confederacy in general than to its Union soldiers.[89] Surely, that fact alone places Maryland in a unique position relative to other Union states.
The simple fact is that the preponderance of evidence suggests Maryland would have seceded if allowed to make that choice. The antebellum voting records of Marylanders were consistent with the Confederate states. Maryland suffered a military occupation and martial law existed in the state for the duration of the war, unlike any other state. No other state was forced to accept the voter fraud or intimidation of its citizens on the scale suffered by Marylanders. Nor did any state suffer the indignity of having such a large number of its public servants arrested without trial. Maryland’s elite families overwhelming supported the Confederacy. For an ostensibly loyal state, the Federal government had the most difficulty in securing recruits in Maryland, at a time when most other states provided enlistees well in excess of their quotas. Lastly, if Maryland held the Unionist sympathies as argued by Baker, Evitts, Freehling , et al., why were these Unionist policies rejected after the war when the Federal Army was no longer able to influence the politics of the state? The answer is quite simply that Marlyand would have left the Union, but the military occupation made it impossible for the Southern sympathizing Marylanders to realize that goal. It was not out of love for the Union or the Lincoln Administration that Maryland remained in the Union, it was at the point of the bayonet. In that regard, Maryland was the South’s first casualty.
Appendix D
Maryland, My Maryland
By James Ryder Randall
I The despot's heel is on thy shore,
Maryland! My Maryland! His torch is at thy temple door,
Maryland! My Maryland! Avenge the patriotic gore That flecked the streets of Baltimore, And be the battle queen of yore,
Maryland! My Maryland!
II Hark to an exiled son's appeal,
Maryland! My Maryland! My mother State to thee I kneel,
Maryland! My Maryland! For life and death, for woe and weal, Thy peerless chivalry reveal, And gird thy beauteous limbs with steel,
Maryland! My Maryland!
III Thou wilt not cower in the dust,
Maryland! My Maryland! Thy beaming sword shall never rust,
Maryland! My Maryland! Remember Carroll's sacred trust, Remember Howard's warlike thrust, And all thy slumberers with the just,
Maryland! My Maryland!
IV Come! 'tis the red dawn of the day,
Maryland! My Maryland! Come with thy panoplied array,
Maryland! My Maryland! With Ringgold's spirit for the fray, With Watson's blood at Monterey, With fearless Lowe and dashing May,
Maryland! My Maryland!
V Come! for thy shield is bright and strong,
Maryland! My Maryland! Come! for thy dalliance does thee wrong,
Maryland! My Maryland! Come to thine own anointed throng, Stalking with Liberty along, And chaunt thy dauntless slogan song,
Maryland! My Maryland!
VI Dear Mother! burst the tyrant's chain,
Maryland! My Maryland! Virginia should not call in vain,
Maryland! My Maryland! She meets her sisters on the plain "Sic semper!” 'tis the proud refrain That baffles minions back again,
Maryland! My Maryland! Arise in majesty again,
Maryland! My Maryland!
VII I see the blush upon thy cheek,
Maryland! My Maryland! For thou wast ever bravely meek,
Maryland! My Maryland! But lo! there surges forth a shriek, From hill to hill, from creek to creek Potomac calls to Chesapeake,
Maryland! My Maryland!
VIII Thou wilt not yield the Vandal toll,
Maryland! My Maryland! Thou wilt not crook to his control,
Maryland! My Maryland! Better the fire upon thee roll,
Better the blade, the shot, the bowl, Than crucifixion of the soul,
Maryland! My Maryland!
IX I hear the distant thunder-hum,
Maryland! My Maryland! The Old Line's bugle, fife, and drum,
Maryland! My Maryland! She is not dead, nor deaf, nor dumb- Huzza! she spurns the Northern scum! She breathes! she burns! she'll come! she'll come!
Maryland! My Maryland!
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LesCallette, Millar G. A Study of the Recruitment of the Union Army in the State of Maryland 1861-1865. M.A. Thesis, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1954.
Manakee, Harold R. Maryland in the Civil War. Batlimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1961.
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Neely Jr., Mark E. The Fate of Liberty, Abraham Lincon and Civil Liberties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Newman, Harry Wright. Maryland and the Confederacy. Annapolis: Newman, 1976.
Radcliffe, George L.P. Governor Thomas H. Hicks Of Maryland And The Civil War. Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press, 1901.
Ruffner, Kevin Conley. Maryland's Blue and Gray, A Border State's Union and Confederate Junior Officer Corps. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.
Sharf, John Thomas. History of Maryland, From the Earliest Period to the Present Day. Baltimore : John P.Piet, 1879.
Talbert, Bart Rhett. Maryland. The South's First Casualty. Berryville, VA: Rockbridge Publishing Co., 1995.
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[1] The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (hereafter O.R.) series 1, 2.607.
[2] Jean Harvey Baker. The Politics of Continuity, Maryland Political Parties from 1858 to 1870, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) 54.
The same sentiments, in favor of Maryland Unionism, can be found in William J Evitts’ A Matter of Allegiances, Maryland From 1850 to 1861, from 1974, and Richard R. Duncan’s chapter on the Civil War in Maryland, A History, also from 1974. Interestingly, all are works of the post Civil Rights Era. They are noticeably absent from the histories of the state by George Radcliffe, Thomas J Scharf, Harold R. Manakee and Mathew Page Andrew. Of the latter works, only Manakee’s, was written during the Civil Rights Movement.
[3] Ibid.
Disappointingly, Baker cites George William Brown’s, Baltimore and the 19th of April 1861, page 77 in support of her argument, in fact, Brown states, quite emphatically that Maryland was held in the Union by force.
[4] Lawrence M. Denton. A Southern Star for Maryland, Maryland and the Secession Crisis, (Baltimore, MD: Publishing Concepts, 1995) 195-196.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Michael F. Holt. The Political Crisis of the 1850’s. (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. 1978) 95, 248.
[7] Denton, 22.
[8] William J Evitts. A Matter of Allegiances; Maryland From 1850 to 1861, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) 168.
[9] Ibid, 168-169.
[10] See footnotes page 4.
[11] William W. Freehling. The Road to Disunion: Volume Two Secessionists Triumphant., 1854-1861. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 500.
[12] Evitts 168-169.
[13] Baker, 40-45.
[14] Denton, 39.
[15] Daniel W. Crofts, Reluctant Confederates. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989) 258.
[16] Denton, 39.
[17] John Thomas Scharf. History of Maryland From the Earliest Period to the Present Day Volume Three 1819-1880. (Baltimore: John P. Piet, 1879) 362-364.
[18] George L.P. Radcliffe. Governor Thomas H. Hicks of Maryland and the Civil War. (Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press, 1901) 67-68.
[19] Ibid, 21.
[20] Ibid, 22.
[21] Ibid, 51,55.
In a March 28, 1861 letter to Hicks, Bell supporter James Dennis supported the Union on the condition that force was not used to coerce the Confederacy. Hicks replied in agreement.
[22] Ibid, 50.
[23] Baltimore Sun (courtesy of the Maryland Historical Society) February 20, 1861.
[24] Ibid.
[25] George William Brown, Baltimore and the 19th of April, 1861. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1887) 38.
[26] Ibid, 34.
[27] Scharf, 400.
[28] Daniel Carroll Toomey, The Civil War in Maryland. (Baltimore: Toomey Press, 1983) 13.
[29] Evitts, 168-169. Baker 55-56.
[30] Denton 94, 120. OR series 1, 2:615-618.
[31] Radcliffe, 69.
[32] Maryland Senate Journal, April 27, 1861, p. 8.
[33] Baker, 55.
[34] Ibid, 56.
In support of her argument, Baker mentions correspondence between Hicks and Butler, Lincoln’s Secretary John Nicolay, a doctoral dissertation by Charles Cook and finally George Radcliffe. Yet, she again misquoted Radcliffe. Baker’s comments that Hicks thought that the Legislature was loyal is not supported by the evidence provided. Baker, 55n-56n.
[35] Radcliffe, 73-74; Senate Journal April 27, 1861, p. 8. Journal of the House of Delegates, April 27, 1861, p.22.
[36] Senate Journal April 29, 1861. Journal of the House of Delegates May 1, 1861.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Joint House of Delegates and Senate Journal 1861 Supplement D.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Radcliffe 80-82.
[41] Talbert, 56. Radcliffe, 100-105.
[42] Senate Journal 1861 Supplement J.
[43] Radcliffe, 109.
[44] Mark E. Neely Jr. The Fate of Liberty, Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 4-9.
Unfortunately, a review of Neely’s book is beyond the scope of this work, but it is disturbing that Neely refers to critics of Lincoln as a bunch of “sore losers.” Such proclamations on the part of Neely tends to undermine his scholarship. Neely criticizes the politically partisan while he himself engages in politically motivated rants. It is disturbing that this book won a Pulitzer Prize in light of the serious questions of Neely’s scholarship brought up in Kenneth Noe’s article “Who were the Buschwhackers?” on Union arrests in West Virginia. It would seem that Neely either deliberately or inadvertently seriously underestimated the number of arrests though such records are in the National Archives. For example, Neely claims the records for Camp Chase were lost, but they are readily available at the National Archives.
[45] Harold R. Manakee. Maryland in the Civil War. (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society Press, 1961) 55. Denton, 152-153. Radcliffe, 110-111.
[46] Denton 152-153.
[47] Baker, 58.
[48] Radcliffe, 113.
[49] Ibid, 117.
[50] Harry Wright Newman. Maryland and the Confederacy.
[51] Denton, 155.
[52] Daniel Carroll Toomey and Scot Sumpter Sheads. Baltimore During the Civil War. (Baltimore: Toomey Press, 1997) 173-175.
[53] Talbert, 65.
[54] Robert J. Brugger, Maryland, A Middle Temperment 1634-1980. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) 293.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Newman, 196.
[57]Talbert, 88-89. Radcliffe, 89; Daniel D. Hartzler, Marylanders in the Confederacy. (Westminster, MD: Willow Bend Books, 1986) 3-31; W.W. Goldsborough, The Maryland Line in the Confederate Army 1861-1865. (Gaithersburg, MD: Olde Soldier Books, 1987) 329-333.
[58] Talbert, 55-56.
[59] Denton, 178.
[60] Kevin Conley Ruffner, Maryland’s Blue and Gray, A Border State’s Union and Confederate Junior Officers Corps. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997) 74.
[61] Ibid, 74-75.
[62] Ibid, 65, 76-91.
[63] Ibid, 73.
[64] Denton, 180.
[65] Ibid, 181.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Millard G. LesCallette, A Study of the Recruitment of the Union Army in the State of Maryland, 1861-1865. (M.A. Thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1964) 25, 37.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Denton, 170.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Hartzler, 3-21.
[73] Denton, 176.
[74] Ibid.
[75] LesCallette, 55-57.
[76] Ruffner, 11. Goldsborough, 323-329.
[77] Manakee, 108-133.
[78] Ibid, 111.
[79] Ibid, 112.
[80] Ibid, 113.
[81] Ruffner, 57.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid, 58.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Denton, 206.
[86] Ibid, 205.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Talbert, 91.
[89] Newman, 172-176.
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